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Abstract. The role of inherited wealth in modern economies has increasingly come
under scrutiny. This study presents one of the first attempts to shed light on how demo-
graphic aging could shape this role. It shows that, in the absence of retirement annu-
ities, or for a given level of annuitization, both increasing longevity and decreasing
fertility should reduce the inherited share of total wealth in a given economy. Thus,
aging is not likely to explain a recent surge in this share in some advanced economies.
Shrinking retirement annuities, however, could offset and potentially reverse these
effects. The paper also shows that individual bequests will be more unequally dis-
tributed if aging is driven by a drop in fertility. In comparison, the effect of increasing
longevity on their distribution is non-monotonic.
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1. INTRODUCTION
An important premise of modern capitalism is the idea that anyone, regardless
of her parent’s wealth, can become rich with the right entrepreneurial skills. A
recent surge of self-made billionaires is often considered to be the proof of this.
For instance, Kaplan and Rauh (2013) report that among the Americans who
made it to the Forbes 400 list, which provides a list of the wealthiest people
ranked by net worth, the share of those who grew up wealthy fell from 60% to
32% between 1982 and 2011. There seems to go the age of aristocracy, inherited
wealth and privilege. But, does it?
Notwithstanding the observation above, the role of inherited wealth is on the
rise in a number of advanced economies. Piketty and Zucman (2014) show that
although the inherited share of total wealth decreased steadily from the
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beginning of the twentieth century until the 1970s in Europe (Figure 1 for
France, UK and Germany), it began to increase again after that, a trend that has
continued. Accordingly, the earlier reduction was driven by wars in the first half
of the century, which impoverished the population across the board. Conse-
quently, those who died between 1950 and 1960 were reported to be the least
wealthy generation (measured at the time of death) in the twentieth century.
The reasons for the increase in the inherited share of total wealth are less clear.
In this paper, we explore two possible explanations: population aging and
changes in retirement annuities.
Our first aim is to investigate how exactly the aging of a population affects
the size and distribution of its inherited wealth. It is well known that decreasing
mortality and fertility rates, both of which lead to an increase in average age in a
society, have led to dramatic changes in the demographic structure of societies,
especially in high-income countries, in recent decades. Figure 2 shows the sur-
vival curves from 1950 to 2010. For instance, a 60-year-old person could expect
to live about 17 more years in 1950, and that has increased to 23 by now. In the
meantime, the fertility rate fell from about 3 children per woman to 1.8 chil-
dren. In this paper, we formalize the ideas summarized in a companion paper by
Onder and Pestieau (2016), to study the effects of these changes on the role of
inheritance in modern societies in a somewhat systematic manner.1
In particular, we are interested in shedding light on the effects of a
decrease in fertility and of an increase in longevity on two indicators that

































Figure 1 The share of inherited wealth in total private wealth, 1900–2010
Source: Piketty and Zucman (2014).
1. See also Weil (1996).
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(1) Inherited share of total wealth (ISW), which indicates the aggregate role of
inheritance,
(2) Inherited wealth inequality (IWI), which characterizes the distribution of
inheritance.
In order to investigate the effects of aging on these two indicators, we adopt a
simple two-period OLG model where individuals save for retirement and for the
joy of bequeathing. As parts of these savings are not annuitized, the model also
features accidental bequests in addition to altruistic bequests. Using this frame-
work, we find that aging in either form, a decrease in fertility or an increase in
longevity, is not likely to explain the U-shaped pattern in the inherited share of
total wealth in advanced economies. Both types of aging are expected to reduce
the ISW. This is primarily because intentional as well as accidental bequests fall
following a decrease in fertility, and although individual accidental bequests
become larger with decreasing mortality, they also become less frequent, which
dominates the effect on the size.
Our results also suggest an alternative mechanism that could generate such a
U-shaped pattern of the ISW after the Second World War: the rise and fall of
retirement annuities. In many high-income countries, public and private defined
benefits systems took up after the Second World War and the benefits provided
by these systems increased steadily for several decades. Our findings show that,
other things being equal, an increase in such annuitization could lead to a
decrease in the ISW. Interestingly, however, the annuitization trend was reversed
toward the end of the century following a decline in public pension benefits and
a progressive shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pensions. Thus,
in theory, the rebound of the ISW could be driven by such a progressive aban-
donment of annuitized retirement savings.
Before proceeding two observations are in order. First, several authors have
challenged the findings of Piketty and Zucman as to the recent upsurge of inher-



































Survival Tables (High Income Countries, 1950-2010)
Source: United Nations Population Division, 2014
Figure 2 Evolution of survival in high-income countries, 1950–2010
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Rognlie (2015), on the other hand, joins many other critiques to show that real
estate wealth is not properly measured in Piketty’s work. Second, the recent
decline in the annuitization of retirement saving comes from two factors. There
is the widespread decline in individual public pension benefits that is due to the
increase in the number of retirees and to the governments’ budgetary difficulties.
For example, in most European countries one observes a sharp decline in the
replacement ratio in public pensions. This is due to the fact that they apply
indexation rules for pensions that do not fully reflect a 1:1 relationship with
nominal wage increases. (See on this European Commission, 2015). Furthermore,
in private pensions, either mandatory or voluntary, there is a trend toward
defined contribution formulas along with a payout in capital instead of in annu-
ities. Such a trend can be explained by the desire of pension funds to reduce
financial and longevity risks and by the preference of retirees toward cashing in
assets accumulated in defined contribution pension plans (see Antolin, 2008;
Munnell et al., 2015).
Our paper is related to the existing literature in several ways. First, it extends a
companion paper by Onder and Pestieau (2016) by providing formalization and
analytical analysis as well as generalizing it, particularly by considering a more
general utility function. Also, like Dedry et al. (2017) who study the impact of
aging on capital accumulation and welfare in economies with unfunded pen-
sions, it deals with the differential impact of fertility and mortality changes with
emphasis on the structure and the distribution of wealth. The paper is also
related to an important literature that focuses on the saving behavior of the
elderly by looking at alternative motives and at individual characteristics (see,
for instance, De Nardi et al., 2006, 2009, 2010, 2016; Ameriks et al., 2011). These
papers use a quite different technique than ours. Finally, Fleurbaey et al. (2017),
using a similar setting as in this paper, adopt a normative point of view and look
at the design of an optimal estate tax.
This paper continues as follows. In section 2, we present the general model
and discuss what special cases we are going to use. Section 3 studies the effects
of aging on the inherited share of total wealth, while section 4 looks at the
inequality of inherited wealth. In both sections, we separate the cases with and
without annuitization. Finally, section 5 focuses on some numerical simulations,
whereas the last section provides some concluding remarks.
2. GENERAL MODEL
We use a simple two-period overlapping generations model to show our points.
An individual who belongs to generation t can live for two periods: t and t + 1.
All individuals live a healthy life in the first period of their lifetimes; however,
only a portion p 2 [0, 1] of them can survive to live in the second period. We
assume that the ex ante probability of survival, p, is identical for all individuals
regardless of their income and wealth.2
2. We come back to this assumption in the conclusion. See Lefebvre et al. (2013) for an analysis on
income-differentiated mortality.
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In the first period, each individual works and earns a wage wt and receives a
bequest from her parent bt . A portion of these is used to finance the first-period con-
sumption, ct , and the rest is saved for two reasons: leaving bequests for own children
(xtÞ and financing a possible second period consumption, where the individual is
assumed not to work for simplicity. The consumption oriented savings comprise a
predetermined component in the form of annuities at and a voluntary component
st , which is not annuitized. The amount of annuities is exogenous. It is supposed to
comprise both public pensions and mandatory annuities.3 The bequest is motivated
as a ‘warm glow’ giving that is based on some internal feeling of virtue arising from
sacrifice in helping one’s children or by the desire of controlling their life.4
If the individual lives over two periods successfully, then the second period
consumption is given by dtþ1 ¼ Rtþ1ðst þ atp Þ, where the second component in
the brackets shows the annuities adjusted by the survival rate, and her bequest
per child is given by htþ1 ¼ Rtþ1xt=n, where Rtþ1 is the interest earnings on sav-
ings and n is the number of children.5 In comparison, if the individual dies at
the end of the first period, all her savings will ‘accidentally’ be inherited by her
children, htþ1 ¼ Rtþ1ðst þ xtÞ=n and her claims to annuity will be reflected in
other beneficiaries’ annuities.
While everyone in the same generation is assumed to have the same wage,
individuals differ according to the bequests they receive. Bequests depend on the
individuals’ family history and in particular, on their ancestors’ longevity. In the
general case, starting from generation t = 0, there are 2t types of individuals in
each generation t. These types include a dynasty where all ancestors happened to
die prematurely, another dynasty where all ancestors enjoyed complete life spans
and all combinations in between these two. Denoting by jt (jt 2 ½1; 2t ) an indi-
vidual type in generation t, the utility maximization problem of type jt individ-





t ¼ vðcjtt Þ þ pd½uðdjttþ1Þ þ ncuðhjttþ1Þ þ ð1 pÞdncuðhjttþ1Þ ð1Þ
s.t. c
jt
t ¼ wt þ bjtt  sjtt  xjtt  at ;
d
jt














Rtþ1ðsjtt þ xjtt Þ
n
where d is the discount factor, and c 2 [0, 1] shows the relative utility weight of
bequests in comparison to consumption. The first-order conditions of this prob-
lem are given by:6
v0ðcjtt Þ ¼ pdu0ðdjttþ1ÞRtþ1 þ ð1 pÞdcu0ðhjttþ1ÞRtþ1 ð2Þ
v0ðcjtt Þ ¼ pdcu0ðhjttþ1ÞRtþ1 þ ð1 pÞdcu0ðhjttþ1ÞRtþ1 ð3Þ
3. Implicitly we assume fully funded pensions. We come back to this assumption in the conclu-
sion.
4. See Andreoni (1990) for this.
5. We assume equal sharing of estate. We also assume that fertility is independent of individuals’
income and wealth (we come back to this assumption in the conclusion).
6. We assume that at is sufficiently small so that all individuals choose to save a positive amount.
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and the following equilibrium association between consumption and bequest
motives:
u0ðdjttþ1Þ ¼ cu0ðhjttþ1Þ ð4Þ
To obtain more analytical insights, in what follows we are going to use specific
subutility functions. In particular, we are going to assume u() = log () and,
when possible, also vðcjtt Þ ¼ logðcjtt Þ. However, for tractability reasons, we often
need to assume that vðcjtt Þ is linear and so the overall utility is of quasi-linear
form. This assumption breaks the link between successive bequests, i.e. the opti-
mal bequest chosen by an individual for her offspring is independent of the
bequest she receives. Thus, at any given time, there are only two individual types
in the economy: the offspring of those who die prematurely and leave a large
bequest in intentional and accidental form, i.e. bt ¼ ht , and the offspring of
those who enjoy a long life span and leave only intentional bequests, i.e.
bt ¼ ht .7 This significantly simplifies the model and allows us to derive some
analytical results when that is not possible with a more general specification. We
admit, however, that quasi-linearity is a strong assumption. Therefore, in section
5, we provide some numerical simulations using the specification where all sub-
utilities are logarithmic. Other assumptions we use are that annuities are actuari-
ally fair and that, in spite of aging, the expected length of activity is constant.
We are primarily interested in showing how changes in fertility and survival
rates, n and p, respectively, affect a commonly used indicator of wealth accumu-
lation, namely the share of inherited wealth in total wealth (ISW). Furthermore,
we look at the effect of aging on inherited wealth inequality (IWI).
3. INHERITED SHARE OF TOTAL WEALTH
In our simple model, the share of inherited wealth in total wealth can formally
be defined as follows:
Inherited share of total wealth (ISW): Wtþ1 ¼ ð1 pÞst þ xt
st þ at þ xt ; ð5Þ
where st is the average saving and xt is the average intentional bequest in
generation t.
We start by considering the logarithmic specification for all subutility func-
tions in the individual utility. Thus, the utility of type jt individual now writes
as
7. Note that bequests of short-lived parents are by construction larger than those of long-lived ones
since the premature death occurs at the end of the first period. This is generally not true when
death can strike also before the end of the working period. If an individual dies during the work-
ing period, it is likely that he/she has little savings and only a small amount put aside as a
planned bequest, so the bequest that his/her children will get is likely to be small. In that case,
children of long-lived parents may have larger bequests than children of short-lived parents.
While such a situation could be relevant in the first half of the twentieth century, we do not
consider it in our analysis since our primary interest is in more recent trends.
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U
jt
t ¼ logðcjtt Þ þ pd½logðdjttþ1Þ þ nc logðhjttþ1Þ þ ð1 pÞdnc logðhjttþ1Þ































The first condition equalizes the marginal disutility from saving in the first
period to the expected marginal utility of saving in the second period. Thus, the
individual increases her savings until the expected sum of these utilities is equal
to the opportunity cost of saving. The same idea applies to the voluntary
bequests, x
jt









which is a special case of equation (4). Intuitively, voluntary savings for
future consumption and intentional bequests should yield the same marginal
utilities after adjusting for the number of offspring and expected annuity
benefits.
On the production side, we assume a Cobb–Douglas production function
yt ¼ kat , where kt is the average capital stock. From this it follows that
Rtþ1 ¼ aka1tþ1 and wt ¼ ð1  aÞkat .
The motion of capital is described as nktþ1 ¼ st þ at þ xt . Note that capital is
assumed to depreciate completely after each period. Although this assumption
arises from convenience, it is not unrealistic considering the fact that a period
denotes several decades in calendar.

































t is the probability of type jt in the society.
The inherited share of total wealth thus writes as
Wtþ1 ¼
ð1 pþ ncÞst þ nc atp
ð1þ ncÞst þ at þ nc atp
ð10Þ
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We will now discuss separately the case when there are no annuities (at ¼ 0)
and the case when annuities are present.
3.1. The Case without Annuities
Note that when at ¼ 0, i.e. we shut down the annuity channel, all savings are




t become proportional in equation (8).
Although this observation is not specific to logarithmic utility form, it proves to
be an important property.8
When at is set to zero, equation (10) is reduced to
Wtþ1 ¼ ð1 pÞ þ nc
1þ nc
from which @Ψ/@p < 0 and @Ψ/@n < 0 follow through. Indeed, an increase in
longevity decreases the frequency of accidental bequests and a decrease in fertil-
ity reduces intentional bequests. We summarize this result in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. In the absence of annuities, the inherited share of aggregate
wealth decreases with an increase in longevity (decrease in mortality) or a
decrease in fertility.
This is the most important and rather robust result of our analysis. A decrease
in fertility or an increase in longevity has a depressive effect on the relative
importance of inheritance in wealth accumulation.
3.2. The Case with Annuities
We have just seen that without annuities, aging has a clear depressing effect on
inherited wealth whether it arises from declining fertility or increasing longevity.
We now explore the alternative idea that an increase in the share of inherited
wealth could be driven by a decline in annuitized retirement savings. To investi-
gate this, we now consider at [ 0.
When at was equal to zero, we saw that the inherited share of total wealth
reduced to a simple expression which does not depend on the model’s endoge-
nous variables. With at [ 0, this is no longer the case and we have to consider
the whole expression in equation (10). Thus, we now need to solve the model
for st or at least to know how it depends on n, p and at . However, this becomes
impossible when the utility function is non-linear in the first period consump-
tion. Therefore, to analyze the case of at [ 0 , we use quasi-linear utility. In par-
ticular, individual utility now writes as
Ut ¼ wt þ bt  st  xt  at þ pd½logðdtþ1Þ þ nc logðhtþ1Þ þ ð1 pÞdnc logðhtþ1Þ




t can also be generated by any subutility
function of the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) form.
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where bt 2 fht ; ht g. Note that we no longer use the superscript jt since with
quasi-linear utility, individual choices of savings and intentional bequests do not
depend on the received bequests and are thus the same for all individuals.








st þ xt ¼ 0 ð12Þ
which, as before, gives the relationship
xt ¼ nc st þ atp
h i
ð13Þ
We are now going to explore the effects of annuities, fertility and longevity
on equilibrium voluntary savings st and intentional bequests xt and, conse-
quently, on the inherited share of total wealth.




¼ ½pðst þ xtÞ
2 þ ð1 pÞx2t 









p pðst þ xtÞ2 þ ð1 pÞnc st þ atp
 2þð1 pÞx2t
h i [ 0 ð15Þ
From an individual perspective, annuities and voluntary savings are substitutes
in financing consumption in the second period of life. Thus, given the survival
probability p, an increase in annuities decreases the expected marginal utility
from saving an additional dollar voluntarily. However, the decrease in voluntary
savings is smaller than the increase in annuity benefits, which allows to increase
intentional bequests.
Using equations (14) and (15), we can derive the effect of at on the inherited




ð1 pÞ ðst þ 2xtÞðps2t þ atstÞ þ nc st þ atp
 2ðxt þ ð1 pÞstÞ
h i
pðst þ xtÞ2 þ ð1 pÞnc st þ atp
 2þð1 pÞx2t
h i
½st þ at þ xt 2
\0
Thus, an increase in annuities decreases the inherited share of total wealth.
Indeed, as more voluntary savings are replaced by annuities which do not
become accidental bequests, the share of bequests in total wealth goes down.
Such an increasing trend in annuities was observed in the postwar era in
advanced economies, where pension coverage with defined benefits increased
rapidly. Thus, this result suggests that an increase and a subsequent decrease in
annuitization could theoretically explain the U-shaped pattern of inherited share
of total wealth observed within the last half-century.
The Inherited Inequality
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xt ðst þ xtÞðpst þ xtÞ þ ð1 pÞnc st þ atp
 2h i
n pðst þ xtÞ2 þ ð1 pÞnc st þ atp
 2þð1 pÞx2t
h i\0 ð17Þ
A decrease in fertility decreases both voluntary savings and intentional
bequests. Indeed, it can be seen from the first-order conditions (11) and (12) that
a decrease in n decreases the marginal utility of voluntary savings from the acci-
dental bequest channel and also decreases the marginal utility of intentional
bequests.







at þ p @xt@n st  @st@n xt
 
½st þ at þ xt 2
\0
which follows from the fact that @xt@n st  @st@n xt can be shown to be positive. Thus,
as in the case without annuities, a decrease in fertility decreases the inherited
share of total wealth.






p ðpst þ xtÞ st þ atp
 þ stðst þ xtÞð2at þ pstÞ
p pðst þ xtÞ2 þ ð1 pÞnc st þ atp
 2þð1 pÞx2t





2xtstðst þ xtÞ3 þ ð1 pÞx4t pst  atp
 þ pð1 pÞstx2t stxt  atp st  2atp xt
 
p pðst þ xtÞ2 þ ð1 pÞnc st þ atp
 2þð1 pÞx2t
h i
½pðst þ xtÞ2 þ ð1 pÞx2t 
?0 ð19Þ
An increase in longevity increases voluntary savings. This occurs as a combined
result of three factors. First, consumption needs in the second period of life
become more likely, which has a first-order effect on savings. Second, for a given
level of at , annuity benefits
at
p decrease with p. To compensate for this, and prevent
a substantial loss in second period consumption, the voluntary savings need to be
increased. Third, with higher p, accidental bequests become less likely, therefore
the expected marginal utility from leaving an accidental bequest becomes smaller.
The last negative effect counteracts the previous positive ones; however, in the
end, the former effects dominate and voluntary savings increase in net terms.
On the other hand, the effect of longevity on intentional bequests is generally
ambiguous. As it can be seen from equation (13), the increase in st pushes for
increasing xt , but the decrease in annuity benefits
at
p has an opposite effect, and
the overall impact is not clear.
J. Klimaviciute et al.
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The effect of p on the inherited share of total wealth is generally unclear as
well. For this reason, we explore this effect by performing numerical simula-
tions based on common parameter values from literature. In particular, taking
c = 0.5 and n = 1.5 and varying the level of annuities, the effect of longevity
on the inherited share of total wealth is depicted in Figure 3. In this figure,
the contours denote the iso-Ψ combinations, and as the shades shift from dar-
ker to lighter tones, the inherited share of total wealth increases. It can there-
fore be seen that an increase in longevity decreases the inherited share of
total wealth, i.e. @W@p \ 0: This is again the same effect as in the case without
annuities. This seems to be rather intuitive: longevity encourages voluntary
savings and thus wealth accumulation in the economy, but only a fraction of
these savings is transformed into bequests, and this fraction becomes smaller
as longevity increases.
The results of this subsection can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the presence of annuities, the inherited share of aggregate
wealth decreases with an increase in annuities and with a decrease in fertility.
The effect of an increase in longevity (decrease in mortality) is generally not
clear but is negative with reasonable parameter values.
Figure 3 The impact of changes in longevity on inherited share of wealth (ISW)
Notes: The horizontal axis shows the survival probability (p), while the vertical axis shows
the annuity values (a). The contour curves show the iso-ISW values, and a move from
darker to lighter tones denotes an increase in the ISW.
The Inherited Inequality
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Therefore, we see that, as in the case without annuities, aging has a depressive
effect on the inherited share of total wealth. At the same time, as discussed
above, our results suggest that the U-shaped form of the inherited share of total
wealth could rather be explained by trends in annuitization.
4. INHERITED WEALTH INEQUALITY
In this section, we attempt to assess the impact of aging on the distribution of
inherited wealth. For tractability reasons, to study the inherited wealth inequal-
ity we use the quasi-linear utility specification as in section 3.2. As discussed
before, in this case there are two levels of inherited wealth in the society: those
of the children whose parent survives and those of the children whose parent
did not survive. The indicator of the inherited wealth inequality can formally be
defined as






where xtþ1 2 fhtþ1; htþ1g denote different types of bequest, Vðxtþ1Þ denotes the
variance of bequests, and xtþ1 ¼ phtþ1 þ ð1  pÞhtþ1 shows the average size of
bequest. Therefore, Utþ1 is the coefficient of variation, defined for bequests.9
4.1. The Case without Annuities
We first consider the case when at ¼ 0. In this case, we know that xt ¼ ncst , and
we therefore obtain












ncþ ð1 pÞ ð21Þ






?0 , p 7 1=2
In words, we observe that aging has a dis-equalizing effect for any value of n
and for p < 1/2. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. A decrease in fertility increases the inequality of inherited
wealth in the absence of annuities. In comparison, starting from low levels
9. For the advantages of the coefficient of variation, see Weber (2016).
J. Klimaviciute et al.
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(p < 1/2), an increase in longevity first increases this inequality and then, for
relatively high levels of longevity (p > 1/2), decreases it.
Note that this result depends on how we measure inequality. Using a var-
iance-based indicator (coefficient of variation) to measure the dispersion, as it is
known commonly, implies that the highest variance is reached when the prob-
ability of survival is equal to 0.5.
4.2. The Case with Annuities




xt þ ð1 pÞst ð22Þ





pð1 pÞp @st@at xt  @xt@at st
h i







pð1 pÞp @st@n xt  @xt@n st
 
½xt þ ð1 pÞst 2
[ 0
An increase in annuitization reduces inheritance inequality. Remember that
there are two kinds of inheritance in our model, those that are received by chil-
dren whose parents enjoyed a full life span and those that are received by chil-
dren whose parents died prematurely. The difference between the two is
accidental bequests. These bequests, in turn, are nothing but the voluntary sav-
ings that were not consumed by parents who died prematurely, which is
depressed by an increase in annuities as we discussed above.
On the other hand, a decrease in fertility increases inheritance inequality. We
have seen above that a decrease in fertility reduces both accidental bequests
(through voluntary savings) and intentional bequests. However, it turns out that
the decreases in the two types of bequests are such that the inequality between
the two types of inheritances increases.
As it was the case with the inherited share of total wealth, the effect of longevity on
inheritance inequality is generally not clear. We therefore again perform some numer-
ical simulations which are shown in Figure 4. In this figure, the contours denote the
iso-inequality combinations, and as the shades shift from darker to lighter tones, the
inequality increases. As it can be seen from the figure, the effect of longevity on the
inequality of inherited wealth is not monotonic: dUdp [ 0 for low p and
dU
dp \0 for high
p. Starting from low levels, a rise in longevity initially increases the inequality; how-
ever, it eventually starts decreasing as the survival probability becomes high enough.
Intuitively, as longevity increases, accidental inheritance becomes less frequent but
larger since voluntary savings increase. Thus, both the mean and variance of total
bequests can increase or decrease depending on the exact values.
The above results are summarized in the following proposition.
The Inherited Inequality
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Proposition 4. In the presence of annuities, a decrease in fertility increases and a
rise in annuitization reduces the inequality of inherited wealth. With reasonable
parameter values, an increase in longevity increases inheritance inequality for low
levels of survival probability but decreases it for high probability levels.
5. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In its general form, our model features bequests that are heterogeneous in size,
and this heterogeneity is transmitted across generations by means of successive
bequeathing. This follows from the fact that, for each generation, both acciden-
tal and planned bequests are functions of the transfers received from the pre-
vious generation. Thus, shocks to these transfers at any point in time are
propagated across generations. As a result, each bequest depends on the receiving
person’s family history. More specifically, both the number of previous acciden-
tal bequests following early mortality cases and the exact sequence of those cases
across periods matter in determining the size of inheritance received by an agent,
or her type.
Figure 4 The impact of changes in longevity on inherited wealth inequality (IWI)
Notes: The horizontal axis shows the survival probability (p), while the vertical axis shows
the annuity values (a). The contour curves show the iso-IWI values, and a move from
darker to lighter tones denotes an increase in the IWI.
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Therefore, with some abuse of biblical notation, suppose that an ‘Adam and
Eve’ economy constitutes an atomic generation in t = 0. Then there would be 2t
types of individuals in each generation t > 0. The lineages would include a
dynasty where all ancestors happened to die prematurely, another dynasty where
all ancestors enjoyed complete life spans, and all combinations in between these
two extreme cases.
The problem with the exponentially increasing number of types is that the
characteristics of inherited wealth becomes intractable, analytically.10 Thus, in
this section, we consider a simulation approach to investigating the dynamic
characteristics of the inherited share of total wealth and the inherited wealth
inequality. We are primarily interested in analyzing the sensitivity of these mea-
sures to changes in demographic fundamentals, i.e. a decrease in fertility or an
increase in life expectancy, and a reduction in retirement annuities. In doing so,
we utilize the general model with annuities, which was developed earlier in this
paper.
5.1. Simulation Strategy
In order to explore the genesis of the role played by inheritance in an open-small
economy, we start our simulations with an identical group of individuals
(N = 10), who receive no inheritance in period 0, i.e. bjt¼0 ¼ 0 for all
j 2 {1, . . ., 10}. This initial generation, nevertheless, leaves bequests like other
generations.
In the baseline simulations, population doubles with each successive genera-
tion, i.e. the fertility rate is n = 2. The choice of fertility rate as an integer facili-
tates the numerical traction of expanding number of types, starting from a small
group. Each individual survives to live in the second period of her lifetime with
an ex ante identical probability p = 0.5, as determined by a uniform distribution
over the interval [0, 1]. Given the relatively small size of the population at the
outset, however, the actual draws of survival outcomes in the early periods of
the simulation exercise have sizable implications for the inherited wealth indica-
tors in the subsequent periods: a coincidentally skewed realization of survival
distribution in the first few periods could lead to arbitrary outcomes later. To
address this problem, we run Monte Carlo simulations with 1,000 draws, which
ensures that the actual incidence of survival ratios is firmly centered around the
chosen p.
With exponentially growing number of types and intergenerational linkages
throughout the simulations, Monte Carlo simulations increase computational
load significantly. In order to keep the simulations feasible, we conduct the exer-
cise for a small, open economy, where wages and interest rates are fixed at prede-
termined levels throughout the simulations. In addition, we restrict attention to
10 periods (after period 0), which allows sufficient time for the system to reach a
stable level. We introduce permanent shocks to n, p, or a in period 3 to show
impact on outcomes in both steady states and transition paths.
10. This is why we had to resort to quasi-linear utility function.
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The results are displayed in Figure 5. In what follows, we will discuss impor-
tant findings of this exercise with reference to our theoretical insights developed




































































































































































Figure 5 Dynamics of inheritance with fertility, mortality and annuity shocks
Notes: Simulations use baseline values of n = 2, a = 0.1, and p = 0.5 in cases that do involve
shocks to these parameters. In all cases, the outcome paths admit these values until the
unanticipated and permanent shocks are introduced in the second period. Common
parameter values are as follows: w = 1, R = 1.81, n = 2, d = 1, and c = 0.5. As no inheritance
is received by the generation 0, both ISW and IWI take 0 values before period 1.
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5.2. The Inherited Share of Total Wealth
The first panel in Figure 5 (panel a) shows the evolution of the ISW over time,
as defined by equation (13). The baseline case, where the fertility, mortality
and annuity variables are set at n = 2, p = 0.5 and a = 0.1, respectively, is
shown by the solid line in all three panels as benchmark. Because the initial
generation by assumption receives no inheritance, the average bequests in the
first few periods are also relatively small, but they increase over time despite
the fixed wage and interest rate setting. This increase occurs at a decreasing
rate, and the share of inherited wealth in the economy stabilizes toward the
end of our simulations.
The simulations show the unanticipated and permanent changes in fertility,
survival probability, and retirement annuities, all introduced in the second per-
iod, over three separate figures in panel a. The most important observation
from this exercise is the confirmation that an increase in ISW is not likely to
be driven by an aging demography, a result that is also suggested by our ana-
lytical solutions in the case of the general model without annuities (Proposi-
tion 1) and the quasi-linear model with annuities (Proposition 2). A decrease in
fertility rate from n = 2 to n = 1 reduces the ISW from Ψ = 0.72 to Ψ = 0.64 in
the steady state, as shown by the dashed line in the first figure. Similarly, an
increase in survival probability from p = 0.5 to p = 0.8 or p = 0.9, reduces the
ISW to Ψ = 0.59 and Ψ = 0.55, respectively. Our simulations also confirm the
annuity related findings of Proposition 2. When annuities decrease from a = 1
to a = 0.05, the ISW increases from Ψ = 0.72 to Ψ = 0.74 in the long term.
Thus, overall, our analytical results hold when preferences are characterized by
logarithmic utilities in both periods of life and retirement annuities are taken
into consideration.
5.3. Inherited Wealth Inequality
The first observation to note from panel b is that, in the absence of shocks,
the inherited wealth inequality has a concave and increasing shape over time.
The dispersion of inheritances increases as the number of types grows over
periods. This process, however, slows down in the outer years as the relative
weight of extreme types (e.g. all or none of the ancestors had premature
deaths) are reduced in the pool of types. In the baseline, where the fertility,
mortality and annuity variables are set at n = 2, p = 0.5 and a = 0.1, respec-
tively, the inherited wealth inequality stabilizes around 0.27 in the second half
of the simulations.
Our second observation is about the non-linear effect of mortality rate changes
on the inherited wealth inequality. Although a decrease in fertility from n = 2 to
n = 1 increases the IWI from / = 0.27 to / = 0.57, the effect of mortality shock is
non-monotonic. When p increases from 0.5 to 0.8, the long-term value of the
inherited wealth inequality also increases from / = 0.27 to / = 0.28, as shown by
the dashed line. In comparison, a greater increase, from p = 0.5 to p = 0.9, reduces
the inequality of wealth to about / = 0.23, as shown by the hollow line. This result
confirms the findings of the Propositions 3 and 4, specified with quasi-linear pref-
erences without and with annuities. The simulations here suggest that these results
The Inherited Inequality
© 2019 German Economic Association (Verein f€ur Socialpolitik) 17
are generalizable: starting from low levels, a rise in longevity initially increases the
inequality; however, it eventually starts decreasing as the survival probability
becomes high enough even when inheritances are linked across generations.
Finally, the third observation from our simulation exercise is about the ability
of retirement annuities to explain the increase in the inequality of inheritances
in a given generation. The last figure in panel b shows the scenario where the
retirement annuity decreases from the baseline value of a = 0.1 to a = 0.05 from
second period onward. As a result, the inequality of inherited wealth is stabilized
around / = 0.32 (dashed line) as opposed to its baseline value of / = 0.27 (solid
line). Because the effect of annuity changes on inherited wealth inequality is
monotonic, this exercise omits other possible shocks.
6. CONCLUSION
The first purpose of this paper was to study the impact of aging, that is lower
fertility and higher longevity, on the bequeathing decision and hence on the
share of inheritance in capital accumulation. We also wanted to analyze the
effect that the trends in annuitization could have on the level of inherited
wealth. We show that aging has a depressive effect on the inherited share of
total wealth, whereas declining annuitization, on the contrary, has a fostering
impact.
On this point a caveat is in order. In this paper, we have focused on two types
of bequests, those relying on the absence of annuities and those arising from
some joy of giving. In the companion paper, Onder and Pestieau (2016) discuss
other motives of bequeathing, such as pure altruism and exchange (strategic
bequests). They argue that declining fertility tends to foster altruistic bequests.
As to exchange-related bequests, it is expected that a longer life calls for more
attention from children and, therefore, more bequests in return. The impact of
fertility is less clear. For instance, in the case of strategic bequests, the number of
children decreasing from two to one makes a big difference as the parents lose
part of their bargaining power and have thus to increase their transfers to get a
certain level of attention.
Our findings rest on a quite simple model comprising a number of simplifying
assumptions. The strongest of them is undoubtedly the quasi-linearity of the util-
ity function, which we use to derive the most of our analytical results. On the
other hand, our numerical simulations suggest that the analytical findings
derived with quasi-linear utility are likely to hold with a more general specifica-
tion as well.
Another important limitation is the assumption that the individuals’ long-
evity and fertility are independent of their income and wealth. We know that
in reality longevity increases with income and wealth (see, for instance, De
Nardi et al., 2006, 2009, 2010, 2016). Fertility varies as well, but the direction
is not that clear. Fertility variation would make the problem very difficult; in
particular, the existence of a steady state would not be trivial.11 As to
11. Fleurbaey et al. (2017) analyze the impact of differential fertility with a focus on optimal estate
taxation.
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mortality, we can easily see the implication of assuming that individuals with
higher inherited wealth would have a higher survival rate than those with a
lower inherited wealth. In the same vein, one can expect children from long-
lived parents to have higher survival probabilities than children from short-
lived parents. In the quasi-linear utility case, there would be four types of
individuals instead of two. Wealth inequality would increase, but the rest of
the analysis would be unchanged.
One more point to be made concerns the assumed pension scheme. To make
the analysis simpler, the pension annuities considered in our model are fully
funded and not unfunded as in most social security schemes. One of the implica-
tions of pay-as-you-go pensions as opposed to funded pensions is to discourage
capital accumulation. This would clearly affect the ratio of capital income to
wage earnings, but it should not affect the relation between inherited wealth
and total wealth. On the other hand, if saving is discouraged, then under pay-as-
you-go pensions, the difference between the bequests of children with short-
lived parents and the bequests of those whose parents are long-lived should be
smaller than in a fully funded system (since the difference between these
bequests is accidental bequests), which suggests that the inherited wealth
inequality should be smaller under pay-as-you-go.
It should also be stressed that our paper is clearly positive and not normative.
The only policy instrument that can be considered in our setting is the fraction
of annuitized saving. Our finding that an increase in annuitization reduces the
inherited wealth inequality suggests that fostering annuities may be a desirable
policy from the social point of view.12
Finally, our paper is of relevance even in countries where the U-shaped evolu-
tion of bequests is not observed. In these countries, aging would indeed explain
the observed decrease in the share of inherited wealth in total wealth if the shifts
in annuities as discussed in this paper are absent.
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